El comportamiento fiscal según el modelo de la pendiente resbaladiza en muestras de Argentina y España

Lucas Tanos-Robein, Bianca Saavedra, Débora Mola, Cecilia Reyna

Resumen


Los mecanismos habituales para reducir la evasión fiscal suelen sustentarse en enfoques racionales. Evidencia empírica contrapuesta a estos enfoques llevó al desarrollo de un marco conceptual integrador: el Slippery Slope Framework (SSF), según el cual el cumplimiento fiscal depende de la confianza hacia las autoridades y el poder percibido. En ese marco, condujimos dos estudios experimentales. En ambos estudios utilizamos un diseño factorial inter-sujetos 2 (confianza: alta vs. baja) x 2 (poder: alto vs. bajo). En el primero evaluamos el efecto de la manipulación sobre el comportamiento fiscal de estudiantes de contextos socio-económicos distintos, Argentina y España, sin observar efectos significativos. En el segundo condujimos una réplica de Kogler et al. (2013) con estudiantes de Argentina, evaluando la intención de pago de impuestos. En general, los resultados aportaron evidencia a favor del SSF. Se discuten los resultados de cada estudio y se destaca la relevancia de contar con abordajes experimentales que utilicen el comportamiento fiscal como variable dependiente, así como de continuar evaluando las hipótesis del SSF en distintos contextos.

Palabras clave


comportamiento fiscal; transcultural; confianza; poder; Slippery Slope Framework

Citas


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